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Abstract
We quantiﬁed nosocomial transmission rates of sequence type (ST) 398 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (an emerging
livestock-associated MRSA clone) and non-ST398 MRSA isolates in patients hospitalized without infection control measures in 51 Dutch
hospitals. Identiﬁcation of 174 index patients initiated 139 post-exposure screenings of 9925 persons. There were 65 genotype-con-
ﬁrmed secondary cases (three and 62 for ST398 and non-ST398 MRSA, respectively), yielding a relative transmission risk for ST398
MRSA of 0.28 (95% CI 0.09–0.90), which was not sensitive to adjustment for duration of hospitalization at time of detection. Nosoco-
mial transmission of ST398 MRSA is 72% less likely than that of non-ST398 MRSA strains.
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Introduction
The prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) among invasive nosocomial S. aureus infections has
remained below 1% in countries using a nationwide search
and destroy policy, such as The Netherlands (http://
www.rivm.nl/earss/database/) [1]. Here, MRSA epidemiology
changed dramatically in 2005 when a new community-
acquired MRSA clone of animal origin emerged [2–4]. The
animal-related MRSA isolates appeared to represent a dis-
tinct clone, characterized as sequence type (ST) 398 by mul-
tilocus sequence typing [4]. ST398 MRSA is now also
emerging in other countries, including the USA [5].
Since July 2006, in The Netherlands, all individuals who
have had professional contact with pigs or veal calves are
considered to be at risk of MRSA carriage [6]. Accord-
ingly, such persons are pre-emptively isolated when admit-
ted, while the microbiological results of MRSA screening
are awaited. When MRSA is detected in a non-isolated
patient (i.e. index patient), the patient is isolated, and the
room-mates and healthcare workers (HCWs) involved in
direct care for the index patient are screened for MRSA
carriage. Before July 2006, most individuals at risk of
MRSA carriage were patients who had been admitted to
hospitals abroad, but from July 2006 onwards, the risk
group also included pig and veal calve farmers, their family
members and veterinarians. However, the transmissibility
of ST398 MRSA in hospitals has never been investigated.
We therefore determined nosocomial transmission rates of
livestock-associated MRSA (ST398 MRSA) and other
(healthcare-associated) MRSA isolates (non-ST398 MRSA)
by calculating the numbers of secondary cases following
the detection of MRSA index patients who were hospital-
ized without MRSA-speciﬁc infection control measures.
Importantly, human-derived community-acquired MRSA iso-
lates (such as USA300 and USA400) were only sporadically
encountered, and were therefore not included as a sepa-
rate group in our study.
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Materials and Methods
Collection of data
All Dutch infection control practitioners and medical micro-
biologists were contacted and asked to collect data on all
patients and HCWs who had been screened for MRSA after
exposure to MRSA index patients from July 2006 to October
2006 (3 months retrospectively) and from October 2006 to
January 2007 (3 months prospectively). Information was
obtained from the index case (type of MRSA: ST398 or non-
ST398), location of index case (outpatient clinic or hospital
ward), number of hospital days without isolation measures,
total length of hospital stay, number of screened HCWs and
contact patients, number of secondarily colonized HCWs
and contact patients, and type of MRSA. Detection of MRSA
genotypes in screened HCWs or patients that differed from
the genotype of index cases was considered to be an acci-
dental ﬁnding. Secondary cases were deﬁned as persons col-
onized with the same MRSA genotype as the index case on
the basis of pulsed-ﬁeld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) patterns.
We assumed that all index cases were already colonized at
the time of hospital admission. All calculations are based on
the assumption that all secondary cases were directly
infected by the index case.
MRSA screening
The strict Dutch search and destroy strategy includes,
among other things, screening of patients at high risk of
MRSA carriage when admitted to the hospital or visiting the
outpatient clinic. Swabs from the anterior nares, throat, peri-
neum and, if present, wounds and catheter insertion sites,
and sputum and urine samples (in cases of an indwelling uri-
nary catheter), are obtained according to our guideline
(MRSA guideline, Dutch Working Party on Infection Control:
http://www.wip.nl/free_content/richtlijnen/mrsa%20zie-
kenhuis080310.pdf). HCWs are screened for MRSA carriage
after contact with an unsuspected MRSA carrier, which
means without taking protective measures. For HCWs,
swabs from the anterior nares, throat and, if present, skin
lesions are taken. Conventional microbiological cultures,
including a broth enrichment step for all swabs combined
with selective and non-selective agar plates, are performed
according to the guidelines of the Dutch Society of Medical
Microbiology [7]. All ﬁrst MRSA isolates of newly identiﬁed
carriers are sent to the Dutch MRSA reference laboratory
of the National Institute of Public Health and the Environ-
ment (RIVM) for typing. In 2006, according to the protocol
at that time, isolates were initially genotyped by PFGE with
the enzyme Sma1. Additional typing methods (e.g. multilocus
sequence typing and Spa-typing) were used for livestock-
associated strains, as these isolates can not be typed using
PFGE with Sma1 [8].
Statistical analysis
Differences in transmission of ST398 and non-ST398
MRSA isolates were assessed by calculating relative rates and
relative risk ratios. Continuous variables were compared with
the Mann–Whitney U-test; categorical variables were com-
pared with the chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test. All
analyses were performed using SPSS 15.00 for windows (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA), with signiﬁcance deﬁned as p <0.05.
Results
Fifty-one hospitals (52% of all general and academic hospitals
in The Netherlands) participated, yielding data on
306 months of MRSA policy. There were 174 MRSA-positive
index patients, and post-exposure screenings were per-
formed in 139 cases in 38 hospitals (with 9925 individuals
being screened for MRSA). MRSA carriage was documented
in 24 of 139 (17%) contact screenings, in most cases (75%)
in a single person only. Data on the length of hospital stay
and duration of isolation measures were missing for 17 index
patients, and the corresponding post-exposure screenings
were therefore excluded from the analysis. Eighty post-expo-
sure screenings (with 7892 persons screened) were per-
formed because of non-isolated hospitalized patients, and
included in our study. The remaining 42 post-exposure
screenings were performed in the outpatient clinic (with 507
individuals being screened) and were therefore not included.
When categorized according to the MRSA type (ST398 or
non-ST398), the characteristics of index patients were com-
parable, except for the duration of hospitalization without
isolation measures, which was longer for non-ST398 MRSA
carriers (Table 1).
Secondary cases were documented in three of 964 (0.3%)
HCWs and none of 183 patients screened (0.3% of all indi-
viduals screened) for ST398 MRSA, and in 29 of 4794 (0.6%)
HCWs and 33 of 1951 (1.7%) patients screened (0.9% of all
individuals screened) for non-ST398 MRSA (Fig. 1). The rela-
tive risk of transmission of ST398 MRSA, as compared with
non-ST398 MRSA, was 0.28 (95% CI 0.09–0.90). The number
of days in hospital without infection control measures were
94 (median: 1.5) and 489 (median: 4.0) for index patients
carrying ST398 and non-ST398 MRSA, respectively. The
numbers of secondary cases per 30 days of hospitalization of
a colonized patient without isolation measures were 1.0 and
3.8 for ST398 and non-ST398 MRSA, respectively (p 0.01;
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Fisher’s exact test), yielding a relative transmission rate of
0.27 (95% CI 0.09–0.86) for ST398 as compared with non-
ST398. The three HCWs secondarily colonized with ST398
had no other risk factor for carriage of ST398; they had had
no contact with livestock and did not live on a farm.
The proportions of individuals carrying MRSA genotypes
other than those of index patients were 0.04% for ST398
MRSA (0.06% HCWs; 0% patients) and 0.2% for non-ST398
MRSA (0.14% HCWs; 0.47% patients) (p 0.35; Fisher’s exact
test) (Fig. 1).
Discussion
Livestock-associated ST398 MRSA is 72% less transmissible
than other MRSA genotypes in Dutch hospitals. The lower
transmission capacity may be caused by pathogen-related or
patient-related characteristics. These ﬁndings suggest that
ST398 MRSA isolates that are now emerging worldwide rep-
resent a lower risk of nosocomial spread than so-called
healthcare-associated MRSA isolates, and that less stringent
infection control measures might be sufﬁcient.
The observed difference in transmission capacity remains
unexplained. Molecular studies have identiﬁed differences
between ST398 MRSA and both healthcare-associated
MRSA and community-acquired MRSA strains, such as the
absence of important virulence genes (e.g. the Panton–Val-
entine leukocidin gene, tst and LukM) and antimicrobial
resistance genes (19th European Congress of Clinical
Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Abstracts P1372 and
P1376) [4,9,10]. Furthermore, differences in transmission
capacity may also result from different characteristics
among patients carrying different MRSA strains. Although
length of hospital stay, number of contacts with HCWs and
number of post-exposure screenings in intensive-care units
were comparable between the two different patient groups
in our study, other relevant information, such antibiotic
use, was not available.
We made the assumption that all index patients were
already colonized at the day of admission. This assumption is
probably more accurate for ST398 MRSA, as the risk of con-
tracting non-ST398 MRSA carriage is higher in the hospital
environment, which implies that some non-ST398 index
cases might, in fact, have been secondary cases originating
from an index case that was never identiﬁed. As a result, the
true number of days without isolation measures might be
lower for non-ST398 index patients, implying that the
observed difference between transmission of ST398 and
non-ST398 MRSA is underestimated, which actually strength-
ens our conclusion.
TABLE 1. Characteristics of 80 index
patients found to be colonized with
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) (values are expres-
sed as median unless otherwise
stated)
Characteristics of index patients
ST398
MRSA
Non-ST398
MRSA p
Length of hospital stay (days) 7 8 0.36
Number of contacts, screenings/day exposure 16 12 0.75
Post-exposure screenings in ICUs (%) 13 18 0.34
Time of exposure before isolation measures (days) 1.5 4.0 0.04
Time of exposure in cases with transmission, (days) 3.0 13.0 0.06
ICU, intensive-care unit; ST, sequence type.
FIG. 1. Numbers of genotype-conﬁrmed sec-
ondary cases and persons carrying other meth-
icillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
genotypes than the index patient in 80 post-
exposure screenings. HCWs, healthcare work-
ers; ST, sequence type.
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In another, much smaller, Dutch surveillance study, ST398
MRSA carriage was detected in 1/77 (1%) HCWs who were
considered to have frequent contacts with pigs and veal
calves in their home situation [11]. That study was per-
formed in an area with a high density of pig farms. Our study
also included areas with low pig farm densities, yielding a
prevalence of 0.06% of ST398 MRSA carriage among HCWs.
We therefore conclude that the MRSA prevalence in Dutch
HCWs is low for all types of MRSA, and that they do not
represent a serious risk of introducing MRSA into hospitals.
Our study has several limitations. First, we did not collect
clinical and demographic data from index patients, the sec-
ondary cases and screened individuals, and were therefore
unable to identify speciﬁc risk factors for transmission or to
differentiate the transmission potential of individual non-
ST398 MRSA strains. In fact, much larger patient populations
would be needed for such analyses. Community-associated
Panton–Valentine leukocidin-containing MRSA isolates are
still infrequently encountered in The Netherlands, and our
ﬁndings are therefore not generalizable to these types of
MRSA. Second, we could not compare ST398 MRSA isolates
at the molecular level, and therefore cannot be completely
sure that transmission really originated from the index case.
Again, in this respect, our ﬁndings might represent an under-
estimation of the true difference in transmission capacity of
ST398 and non-ST398 MRSA strains.
In conclusion, nosocomial transmission of ST398 MRSA to
HCWs and patients is 72% less likely than that of non-ST398
MRSA strains. As the global emergence of ST398 MRSA in
the animal reservoir, with subsequent spill-over to frequently
exposed individuals, may put a burden on hospitals in regions
with high densities of agricultural industry, infection control
guidelines should consider less stringent control measures
for ST398 MRSA carriers.
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